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ABSTRACT 
Propositional truth-value can be a defining feature of a sentence’s relevance to the 
unfolding discourse, and establishing propositional truth-value in context can be key to 
successful interpretation. In the current study, we investigate its role in the comprehension 
of counterfactual conditionals, which describe imaginary consequences of hypothetical 
events, and are thought to require keeping in mind both what is true and what is false. Pre-
stored real-world knowledge may therefore intrude upon and delay counterfactual 
comprehension, which is predicted by some accounts of discourse comprehension, and has 
been observed during online comprehension. The impact of propositional truth-value may 
thus be delayed in counterfactual conditionals, as also claimed for sentences containing 
other types of logical operators (e.g., negation, scalar quantifiers). In an Event-Related 
Potential (ERP) experiment, we investigated the impact of propositional truth-value when 
described consequences are both true and predictable given the counterfactual premise. 
False words elicited larger N400 ERPs than true words, in negated counterfactual sentences 
(e.g., “If N.A.S.A. had not developed its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the 
moon would have been Russia/America”) and real-world sentences (e.g., “Because 
N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon was 
America/Russia") alike. These indistinguishable N400 effects of propositional truth-value, 
elicited by opposite word pairs, argue against disruptions by real-world knowledge during 
counterfactual comprehension, and suggest that incoming words are mapped onto the 
counterfactual context without any delay. Thus, provided a sufficiently constraining 
context, propositional truth-value rapidly impacts ongoing semantic processing, be the 
proposition factual or counterfactual.
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INTRODUCTION 
What if N.A.S.A. had never developed its Apollo Project? Would the Soviet Union have 
‘won’ the Space Race? Would Neil Armstrong ever have coined his famous words strolling 
across the moonscape? Counterfactual reasoning, our ability to consider this hypothetical 
scenario, is pervasive in everyday life (e.g., Byrne, 2002; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Roese, 1997), and considered one of the hallmarks of complex reasoning skills (e.g., Braine 
& O’Brien, 1991; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The decoupling from reality in language 
and thought may reflect an important step in human evolution that greatly boosted 
cognitive and communicative power (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000), but also presents 
complex processing challenges. After all, if language use draws upon facts and fiction, how 
do we keep the two apart? 
Counterfactuals provide a unique opportunity to study how people establish 
propositional truth-value during language comprehension, the routine processes upon we 
rely daily to determine whether what we hear or read is consistent with what we already 
know. Propositional truth-value, although essential in linguistic and philosophical theories 
of meaning (e.g., Montague, 1973; Tarski, 1944), has not had the centrality in 
psycholinguistic research that its import suggests. This is striking, because propositional 
truth-value is a defining feature, although clearly not the only one, of a sentence’s relevance 
to the unfolding discourse (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2002). Thus, establishing propositional 
truth-value in context can be key to successful interpretation. Research on the processing of 
truth-value has focused on logical operators (e.g., negation, scalar quantifiers), and its 
results have been taken to suggest that propositional truth-value does not modulate early 
measures of semantic processing (e.g., Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos, & Perry, 1983; 
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Kounios & Holcomb, 1992). However, this field of research has often ignored the role of 
contextual relevance: what is literally true need not be a prototypically relevant or plausible 
thing to say (e.g., that a robin is not a tree), and early effects of propositional truth-value 
have been observed using more naturalistic materials (e.g., Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). 
In the current study, we investigate the role of propositional truth-value during 
comprehension of negated counterfactuals about historical events. Such sentences entail a 
unique challenge to the language comprehension system, because following a 
counterfactual premise (e.g., If N.A.S.A. had never developed its Apollo Project), described 
consequences that are consistent with current facts of the real world (e.g., the first country 
to land on the moon being the U.S.A.) may become false, and, vice versa, consequences 
that are in fact false (e.g., the first country to land on the moon being the Soviet Union) 
may become hypothetically true. 
The relationship between fiction and reality has been central in philosophy of 
language and cognitive science (e.g., Gerrig & Prentice, 1991; Searle, 1975). Extant 
theories of human cognition, such as the Conceptual Blending framework (e.g., Coulson, 
2001; Turner & Fauconnier, 1998) and Mental Models theory (e.g., Byrne & Johnson-
Laird, 2009), sometimes assume that conflicting representations (e.g., of what is true and of 
what is false) are simultaneously active (see also de Vega, Urrutia & Riffo, 2007). 
However, while counterfactual thoughts are commonly expressed through language, such 
theories don’t specify how this representational conflict plays out during language 
processing. In contrast, ‘memory-based’ language processing theories (e.g., Gerrig & 
O’Brien, 2005; Kintsch, 1988; Myers & O’Brien, 1998; Sanford & Garrod, 2005) posit that 
words initially activate pre-stored world knowledge and earlier concepts from the text, and 
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that the contents of active memory are subsequently integrated into the discourse context by 
inhibiting contextually irrelevant concepts. Importantly, because the initial stage is blind to 
contextual relevance or propositional truth-value, world knowledge could hinder ongoing 
comprehension. Note that this may particularly be true in counterfactual sentences: if 
factual information is held active during comprehension (e.g., Byrne, 2002), this 
information may act as a ‘lure’ that makes it harder to falsify a counterfactual consequence 
(e.g., the first to land on the moon would be the U.S.A.). 
Recent results support effects of pre-existing real-world knowledge on 
counterfactual comprehension. Ferguson and Sanford (2008) showed that sentences 
describing implausible real-world events (e.g., “Families would feed their cat a bowl of 
carrots”) incurred temporary disruptions during sentence reading, as indexed by longer 
early fixations in eye-tracking, despite a counterfactual context (e.g., “If cats were 
vegetarians”; see Ferguson, Scheepers & Sanford, 2010, for evidence from visual world 
eye-tracking). Ferguson, Sanford and Leuthold (2008) replicated this result with negated 
counterfactuals (e.g., “If cats were not carnivores…”) and showed that counterfactual 
context did not preclude implausible events from eliciting an enlarged N400 ERP, a 
negative voltage deflection in the electroencephalogram that indexes early semantic 
processing (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). Importantly, this N400 effect aligned with the first-
pass reading results, whereas later eye-tracking measures suggested that propositions were 
eventually accommodated into the context. These early disruptions as indexed by first-pass 
reading times and, crucially, the N400, were taken as evidence that mapping utterances 
onto pre-existing world knowledge is an inevitable consequence of the memory retrieval 
mechanisms by which we compute meaning, and that counterfactual context comes into 
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play at a later moment (Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2008; but see Ferguson, 
Sanford & Leuthold, 2007, who reported N400 evidence for rapid integration into an 
affirmative, rather than negated counterfactual world). These conclusions resonate with the 
long-held assumption that non-propositional semantic processes precede post-semantic 
decision processes that compute sentence truth-value, based on the insensitivity of the 
N400 to propositional truth-value in sentences containing logical operators (e.g., Fischler et 
al., 1983; Kounios & Holcomb, 1992; Urbach & Kutas, 2010; but see Nieuwland, Ditman 
& Kuperberg, 2010; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008).  
Although an account wherein counterfactual truth-value comes into play relatively 
late (but not necessarily after lower-level processes are completed) captures extant results, 
it seems hard to reconcile with well-established rapid effects of various types of context on 
the processing of simple declarative sentences (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Tanenhaus, 
Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1995; Van Berkum, 2009). Perhaps due to the 
semantically complex nature of counterfactuals (e.g., Kratzer, 1989), incremental build-up 
of sentence meaning proceeds slowly, thereby delaying any impact of propositional truth-
value, similar to what has been claimed for negation and scalar quantifiers (e.g., Fischler et 
al., 1983). However, an alternative explanation for a delayed impact takes into account 
whether the context is indeed sufficiently supportive for the unfolding message. In possible 
world semantics, the correct interpretation of an unfolding counterfactual resembles the 
actual world as closely as possible with the exception of what is explicitly or implicitly 
required (e.g., Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968). For example, “If cats were vegetarians” 
makes it less implausible, but not necessarily plausible or true, that cat-owners would feet 
their cats carrots, whereas it clearly presupposes that cats would not eat meat. In contrast, 
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“If cats enjoyed eating root vegetables” creates a context in which feeding cats carrots fits 
well. Thus, rationality in counterfactual thinking imposes relevance constraints (e.g., Evans, 
2006), and observed real-world interference may in fact reflect low counterfactual 
relevance. Importantly, successful communication requires linguistic information to be 
relevant to and coherent with the discourse (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2002), whether or not 
its contents abide by the physical and biological laws and historical facts of our particular 
world (e.g., Stalnaker, 1968). Eye-tracking and ERP studies on story comprehension have 
shown that contextual relevance can outweigh real-world plausibility from an early moment 
on (e.g., “the peanut was in love” is processed more easily than “the peanut was salted” 
following a cartoon-like story about an amorous peanut; e.g., Filik, 2008; Nieuwland & 
Van Berkum, 2006), consistent with an account wherein extra-linguistic information is 
rapidly assimilated into a rich mental representation of the relevant context, paving the way 
for retrieving the next word’s meaning, sometimes even before the next word has been 
encountered in the unfolding utterance (e.g., Kutas, Van Petten, & Kluender, 2006; Otten, 
Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2007; Van Berkum, 2009). However, when contextual 
constraints are weak, early eye-tracking measures and the N400 seem to be driven also by 
low-level lexical-semantic factors (i.e., ‘associative priming’ via lexical-associative or 
categorical relationships, as indexed by norms of association, relatedness or semantic 
categories; e.g., Camblin, Gordon & Swaab, 2007; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999; Otten & 
Van Berkum, 2007). Crucially, therefore, the validity of real-world interference effects 
stands or falls with the provision of a sufficiently constraining context, so that described 
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consequences are true and relatively predictable given the counterfactual premise
1
. In the 
current study, this was ensured by the inclusion of two pre-tests. 
The current study addressed the role of counterfactual truth-value during sentence 
comprehension using ERPs, which provide quantitative and qualitative information well in 
advance of (and without the principled need for) explicit behavioral responses. Our 
hypothesis focused on the N400, an ERP waveform whose amplitude peaks at about 400 
ms post-stimulus, with smaller amplitudes indexing facilitated retrieval from semantic 
memory as elicited by content words or other meaningful stimuli (Kutas et al., 2006). N400 
effect onset, when ERP waveforms corresponding to different conditions start to diverge, is 
about 200-300 ms after visual word onset. With spoken words, N400 effects start as early 
as 150-200 ms after word onset, after having heard only two or three phonemes and well 
before a word’s uniqueness point (e.g., Van Petten, Coulson, Rubin, Plante, & Parks, 
1999). These well-established observations suggest that N400 effects elicited by less 
predictable words or semantic anomalies reflect routine, early sense-making processes by 
which every incoming word is related to the preceding context. In the current study, we 
evaluated whether these processes are sensitive to propositional truth-value in a negated 
counterfactual context, or whether they are primarily driven by pre-existing world 
knowledge. 
                                                          
1
 Plausibility ratings collected by Ferguson and colleagues (Ferguson, personal 
communication) suggest that counterfactually consistent continuations were indeed less 
plausible than real-world continuations (3.6 and 4.6, respectively, out of 5-‘highly 
plausible’). Note that Warren, McConnell and Rayner (2009) also reported increased early 
fixations for impossible sentences despite a fantasy context, but the provided context was 
also relatively weak, as reflected in low naturalness ratings (2.69 out of 5-‘very unnatural’) 
and lower cloze completion scores for impossible sentences than for possible sentences 
following the fantasy context (7% and 32%, respectively).  
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Participants read counterfactual and real-world sentences containing critical words 
belonging to word pairs (e.g., ‘Russia’ and ‘America’). These pairs were chosen so that one 
word rendered the counterfactual sentence true (e.g., “If N.A.S.A. had not developed its 
Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon would have been Russia”), whereas 
the other rendered the real-world sentence true (e.g., “Because N.A.S.A. developed its 
Apollo Project, the first country to land on the moon was America”), and so that each word 
was predictable from the context (see Table 1). False sentences were formed by exchanging 
words from each word pair. Note that for counterfactual and real-world sentences alike, 
establishing whether the sentence is true or false requires real-world knowledge (e.g., 
knowledge of the ‘Space Race’ between Russia and America which culminated in 
America’s Apollo Project). If automatically activated real-world knowledge delays the 
impact of propositional truth-value, then critical words in counterfactual true sentences and 
real-world false sentences should both evoke larger N400s than those in counterfactual 
false sentences and real-world true sentences. An alternative version of this hypothesis is 
that real-world knowledge and propositional truth-value form simultaneous constraints, so 
that the effect of truth-value is reduced in counterfactual sentences compared to real-world 
sentences. In contrast, if propositional truth-value impacts semantic processing without 
delay, false sentences should elicit larger N400s than true sentences, for counterfactual and 
real-world sentences alike. Critically, we predicted this result in face of the fact that the 
N400 effects of propositional truth-value are elicited by opposite pairs of critical words. 
 
Table 1. Example sentences and approximate translations with average truth-value rating 
and cloze value of the critical word for each condition 
Condition Example sentences Mean rating Mean cloze 
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of truth-
value  
value (%) 
Counterfactual 
True (CT) 
Si la N.A.S.A. no hubiera desarrollado su 
proyecto Apollo, el primer país en pisar 
la luna habría sido Rusia seguramente. 
“If N.A.S.A. had not developed its 
Apollo Project, the first country to land 
on the moon would have been Russia 
surely.” 
5.62 (.97) 68 (22) 
Counterfactual 
False (CF) 
Si la N.A.S.A. no hubiera desarrollado su 
proyecto Apollo, el primer país en pisar 
la luna habría sido América 
seguramente. 
“If N.A.S.A. had not developed its 
Apollo Project, the first country to land 
on the moon would have been America 
surely.” 
1.68 (.74) - 
Real-World 
True (RWT) 
Como la N.A.S.A. desarrolló su proyecto 
Apollo, el primer país en pisar la luna ha 
sido América seguramente. 
“Because N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo 
Project, the first country to land on the 
moon was America surely.” 
5.50 (1.03) 65 (25) 
Real-World 
False (RWF) 
Como la N.A.S.A. desarrolló su proyecto 
Apollo, el primer país en pisar la luna ha 
sido Rusia seguramente. 
“Because N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo 
Project, the first country to land on the 
moon was Russia surely.” 
1.55 (.64) - 
Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Critical words are underlined for 
expository purposes. For truth-value rating, 1 = False, 7 = True. 
 
METHOD 
Development and Pretest of Materials 
We constructed 133 Spanish sentence quadruplets with two counterfactual and two 
real-world sentences (see Table 1). Critical words were predicates, nouns or proper names, 
and never sentence-final. Counterfactual sentences described hypothetical consequences of 
common-knowledge historical events not having taken place, whereas real-world sentences 
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described actual consequences of these events. The two sentence types differed in three 
respects: counterfactuals started with the conditional ‘Si’, contained a negative premise, 
and involved conditional verb tense, real-world sentences started with ‘Como’ (‘because’), 
were affirmative, and contained no conditional verb tense. 
We first established the expectedness of critical words. Twenty students of the 
University of the Basque Country completed one of two lists with one version of each item 
truncated before the critical word. They were instructed to complete the sentence with the 
first sensible word coming to mind. Cloze value was computed as the percentage of 
participants who used the intended critical word. 
 We subsequently determined whether sentences (truncated after the critical word) 
were, on average, regarded as true or false. Twenty-four different students evaluated one of 
four counterbalanced sentence lists containing only one condition per quadruplet, and 
decided whether the sentences were true (1 = False, 7 = True), skipping any they could not 
evaluate. 
Based on these results, we excluded quadruplets with low cloze value, containing 
true/false sentences rated below/over 4, or sentences skipped by more than two participants. 
In the ultimate set of 120 quadruplets, true and false sentences had similar cloze values and 
ratings across conditions (see Table 1), and critical words were matched for mean log 
frequency (CT/RWT = 1.44/1.55; p = .11; Davis & Perea, 2005) and word length 
(CT/RWT = 6.65/6.89 letters; p = .24). 
For the ERP experiment, we created four counterbalanced lists so that each sentence 
appeared in only one condition per list, but in all conditions equally often across lists. We 
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also included 60 filler sentences, which did not start with ‘Si’ or ‘Como’, and consisted of 
two clauses separated by a comma. 
 
ERP Experiment 
Participants 
Thirty right-handed students (12 males; mean age = 21.3 years) gave written 
informed consent. All were healthy, native Spanish speakers who had not participated in 
the pretests. 
Procedure 
ERP participants read sentences from a monitor (black letters, bright background). 
All sentences were preceded by a fixation cross upon which participants could start the next 
sentence by button-press. The first clause of each sentence was presented for 4000 ms, 
followed by a fixation cross and blank screen each for 500 ms; the second clause was 
presented word-by-word (400 ms word duration, 200 ms inter-word-interval). 
Sentence-final words were sometimes followed by a yes/no comprehension question 
that probed world knowledge related to the sentence. These 60 questions (30 requiring a 
‘yes’ button-press response, participants performed at 91 % accuracy on average) were 
distributed across sentence types. Participants completed a practice-session and six break-
separated experimental sessions. Total time-on-task was 50 minutes. 
Electroencephalogram Recording 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 29 scalp electrodes (left 
mastoid reference; 1 additional right mastoid electrode and 4 electrooculogram electrodes), 
amplified (band-pass filtered at 0.01–30 Hz), and digitized at 250 Hz. Impedance was kept 
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below 5 kOhm. We corrected ocular artifacts using independent component analysis, and 
single-trial waveforms were automatically screened for artifacts during 1000-ms epochs 
(starting 250 ms before critical word onset). Three participants were excluded due to 
excessive artifacts (trial loss > 40 %). For the remaining 27 participants, average ERPs 
(normalized by subtraction to a 250-ms pre-stimulus baseline) were computed over artifact-
free trials per condition (average trial loss = 4.4 %). 
 
RESULTS 
Critical words elicited larger (more negative) N400s in the counterfactual false and 
real-world false sentences compared to counterfactual true and real-world true sentences 
(see Figure 1). N400 effects in counterfactual and real-world sentences started at about 250 
ms after critical word onset, dissipated before 600 ms, and had a broad central-posterior 
distribution. We performed a 2(factuality: counterfactual, real-world) × 2(truth-value: true, 
false) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) using average amplitude across all 
EEG electrodes in 4 consecutive 100 ms time windows starting at 200 ms after critical 
word onset (see Table 2). False sentences elicited larger N400s than true sentences in time 
windows between 300 and 500 ms. Crucially, there was no significant main effect of 
factuality (F< 1.1 for factuality in all time windows), and the effect of truth-value did not 
differ for counterfactual and real-world sentences in any time window (F< 1 for all 
factuality by truth-value interactions). 
We divided the electrodes into those anterior (FP1/2, FZ, F3/4, F7/8, FC1/2, FC5/6) 
or posterior (CP1/2, CP5/6, PZ, P3/4, P7/8, O1/2) to the central cross-line. Subsequent 
2(factuality: counterfactual, real-world) × 2(truth-value: true, false) × 2(distribution: 
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anterior, posterior) repeated measures ANOVAs showed that false sentences elicit larger 
N400 differences at posterior electrodes than at anterior electrodes in the 300-400 window 
(F(1, 26)= 10.12, p(rep) = .97, ηp
2
=.28) and the 400-500 window (F(1, 26)= 5.44, p(rep) = .912, 
ηp
2
=.173), consistent with the typical posterior N400 distribution. This distribution was 
similar for N400 effects elicited by counterfactual and real-world sentences (F< 1 for all 3-
way interactions). Follow-up ANOVAs for the posterior and anterior electrode selection 
separately showed that false sentences elicited larger N400s at anterior electrodes only in 
the 300-400 ms time window, but at posterior electrodes in all time windows between 300-
500 ms (see Table 2).  
  
 
Table 2. Electrophysiological effect of sentence truth-value (false minus true) across counterfactual 
sentences and real-world sentences. Presented are average voltage difference (mean M with 
standard deviation SD in parenthesis), and F value and effect size (partial eta square ηp
2
) results 
from ANOVAs using mean amplitude across all EEG electrodes and in anterior and posterior 
electrode selections, in 4 consecutive 100 ms time windows starting at 200 ms after critical word 
onset 
 Electrodes  200-300 
 
300-400 
 
400-500 500-600 
Truth-value 
(False minus 
True) 
All µV -.42 (2.59) 
 
-1.8 (2.47) 
 
-1.68 (3.31) -.43 (3.15) 
F .72 
 
14.7*** 
 
6.94* .49 
ηp
2
 .03 
 
.36 
 
.21 .02 
 Anterior µV -.37 (3.02) 
 
-1.29 (2.87) 
 
-1.13 (3.63) -.12 (3.56) 
15 
 
F .40 
 
5.46* 
 
2.61 .03 
ηp
2
 . 02 
 
.17 
 
.09 .001 
 Posterior µV -.50 (2.65) 
 
-2.28 (2.55) 
 
-2.12 (3.27) 1.18 
F .97 
 
21.63*** 
 
11.38** .29 
ηp
2
 .04 
 
.45 
 
.30 .04 
For all F tests, numerator df = 1, denominator df = 26. 
*
= p ≤ .05, p(rep) ≥.88. 
**
= p ≤ .01, 
p(rep) ≥ .95. 
***
= p ≤ .001, p(rep) ≥ .986. 
 
Additional 2(factuality: counterfactual, real-world) × 2(truth-value: true, false) × 
2(hemisphere: left, right) repeated measures ANOVAs showed that the effect of truth-value 
did not differ across hemispheres in any of the time windows (F< 1 for all truth-value by 
hemisphere interactions) and that this bilateral distribution was similar for counterfactual 
and real-world sentences (F< 1 for all 3-way interactions). 
 
DISCUSSION 
We examined neural activity while participants read counterfactual and real-world 
sentences varying in truth-value. Counterfactual false sentences elicited larger N400s than 
counterfactual true sentences, and this N400 effect of propositional truth-value was 
indistinguishable from that in real-world sentences. Our results argue against disruptions by 
automatically activated real-world knowledge during counterfactual comprehension, and 
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are at odds with a delayed contribution of context (e.g. Kintsch, 1988; Myers & O’Brien, 
1998; Sanford & Garrod, 2005). Instead, they suggest that incoming words can be mapped 
without any delay onto the most relevant interpretive context, in this case, a counterfactual 
world. Pre-existing factual knowledge did not reflexively impede counterfactual 
comprehension, at least to the extent that counterfactual and real-world false sentences 
similarly disrupted semantic processing, and that counterfactual true sentences did not incur 
semantic processing costs over real-world true sentences. This is principally evidenced by 
the inverted N400 responses to the same lexical items as a function of propositional truth-
value. More generally, the results are consistent with theories of language comprehension 
that do not assume a temporal divide between discourse context and world knowledge (see 
Cook & Myers, 2004). The results provide further evidence that people effortlessly map 
incoming utterances onto what they think is true and what they consider relevant (e.g., 
Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Van 
Berkum, Holleman, Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre, 2009), and may reflect how contextual 
constraints guide expectations about upcoming input (e.g., DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 
2005; Van Berkum, 2009). We take our results as evidence for relatively coarse-grained 
anticipation, a background of expectations of relevance that are revised or elaborated as 
sentences unfold (e.g., Altmann & Mirković, 2009; Van Berkum, 2009, for discussion). 
Our results appear to be at odds with those reported by Ferguson and colleagues 
(Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2008), who showed that counterfactual context 
did not impact first-pass reading times or the N400 in a subsequent target sentence. We 
believe that this apparent contradiction can be accounted for by differences in the strength 
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of contextual constraints
2
. Our study involved counterfactual and real-world sentences that 
were considered to be equally true, containing critical words that were similarly 
predictable. In the studies by Ferguson and colleagues, propositions may have been 
congruent with the counterfactual context, but perhaps did not follow plausibly or 
predictably from it. Although we cannot exclude that their results directly reflect the effects 
of plausibility, their results may reflect low-level lexical-associative factors (e.g., ‘cat-feed-
carrots‘ versus ‘cat-feed-fish‘) that dominate early measures of processing when contextual 
constraints are weak (e.g., Camblin et al., 2007; Otten & Van Berkum, 2007), rather than 
reflecting an inherent aspect of the language processing architecture. We wish to note that 
our own results need not be contingent on the relatively high predictability of the critical 
words, but we do assume they are contingent on having counterfactual and real-world 
sentences that are matched on contextual constraint leading up to the critical word and 
propositional truth-value as rendered by the critical word. 
Another factor that may have contributed to the divergence between our results and 
those of Ferguson colleagues could be the type of counterfactual materials that were used. 
Alternative endings to known historical events may be relatively easily computed, for 
example because relevant information is also part of our real-world knowledge (e.g., of the 
‘Space Race’ and the fact that the Soviets were also making substantial progress in landing 
somebody on the moon at the time that the USA managed to do so), in contrast to 
counterfactual worlds that need to be construed from novel and unfamiliar content (such as 
                                                          
2 Differences in contextual constraint may have been exacerbated by the fact that our 
manipulation occurred in a counterfactual condition sentence whereras earlier studies on 
counterfactual comprehension have looked at later effects (but see Stewart, Haigh & Kidd, 
2009). However, we do not know of any principled reason why there should be differences 
between counterfactual sentence and discourse manipulations. 
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the materials used by Ferguson and colleagues). Theories of counterfactual comprehension 
indeed assume that similarity between counterfactual worlds and the real world facilitates 
counterfactual reasoning (e.g., Lewis, 1973; see Byrne, 2007, for discussion). 
Earlier reported evidence that incoming words are automatically checked against 
real-world knowledge (Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2008) has been taken to 
support the notion that people entertain incompatible mental models during counterfactual 
comprehension (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009; see also de Vega, Urrutia, & Riffo, 2007). 
Although our results do not speak directly to this debate, this mapping onto real-world 
knowledge may index low counterfactual or contextual relevance rather than the presence 
of competing mental models. The fact that even the most relevant distracter, arguably 
receiving strongest lexical-associative priming by the preceding context (e.g., ‘America’ 
following ’N.A.S.A.-Apollo Project-land-moon’), had no visible effect on N400 amplitude 
suggests that subjects only considered the most relevant, counterfactual situation (e.g., 
Evans, 2006). However, competing mental models do not necessarily or perhaps 
sufficiently impact retrieval of word-elicited semantic knowledge during online processing 
to modulate N400 amplitude. On a related note, we do not wish to claim that counterfactual 
comprehension is identical to real-world sentence comprehension, especially at other 
moments in the sentence, such as the construction of the counterfactual context. Rather, we 
propose that at the moment that critical words were encountered, implications of the 
counterfactual context and real-world context had both been computed such that 
propositional truth-value directly impacted semantic processing. Importantly, the N400 
effects of propositional truth-value in the counterfactual sentences and in the real-world 
sentences were elicited by opposite pairs of critical words (see Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 
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2008, for a similar result using affirmative and negative sentences) suggesting that effects 
associated with particular lexical items can be completely overruled in a strong discourse 
context. 
To conclude, if described consequences are true and predictable given the 
counterfactual premise, real-world knowledge does not impede counterfactual 
comprehension, at least at the moment that propositional truth-value can be established. 
Thus, provided a sufficiently constraining context, propositional truth-value rapidly impacts 
ongoing semantic processing, be the proposition factual or counterfactual. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. Electrophysiological effects of truth-value in counterfactual sentences and real-
world sentences. The waveforms show the grand average event-related potentials (ERPs) 
elicited by critical words per condition at 8 selected electrodes. Negative voltage is plotted 
upwards and waveforms are filtered (5 Hz high cut-off, 12 dB/oct) for presentation purpose 
only. Stimuli consisted of counterfactual and real-world sentences that were either true or 
false (examples are provided above the graphs, critical words are underlined). Scalp 
distributions of the difference effects (false minus true sentences) in adjoining 100 ms 
analysis windows are given below the graphs. 
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